Defending Against Backdoor Attack on Graph Nerual Network by Explainability

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2209.02902v1
• Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2022 03:19:29 GMT
• Title: Defending Against Backdoor Attack on Graph Nerual Network by Explainability
• Authors: Bingchen Jiang and Zhao Li
• Abstract summary: We propose the first backdoor detection and defense method on GNN. For graph data, current backdoor attack focus on manipulating the graph structure to inject the trigger. We find that there are apparent differences between benign samples and malicious samples in some explanatory evaluation metrics.
• Score: 7.147386524788604
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Backdoor attack is a powerful attack algorithm to deep learning model. Recently, GNN's vulnerability to backdoor attack has been proved especially on graph classification task. In this paper, we propose the first backdoor detection and defense method on GNN. Most backdoor attack depends on injecting small but influential trigger to the clean sample. For graph data, current backdoor attack focus on manipulating the graph structure to inject the trigger. We find that there are apparent differences between benign samples and malicious samples in some explanatory evaluation metrics, such as fidelity and infidelity. After identifying the malicious sample, the explainability of the GNN model can help us capture the most significant subgraph which is probably the trigger in a trojan graph. We use various dataset and different attack settings to prove the effectiveness of our defense method. The attack success rate all turns out to decrease considerably.

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