Motif-Backdoor: Rethinking the Backdoor Attack on Graph Neural Networks
via Motifs
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2210.13710v2
- Date: Mon, 29 May 2023 03:39:30 GMT
- Title: Motif-Backdoor: Rethinking the Backdoor Attack on Graph Neural Networks
via Motifs
- Authors: Haibin Zheng, Haiyang Xiong, Jinyin Chen, Haonan Ma, Guohan Huang
- Abstract summary: Graph neural network (GNN) with a powerful representation capability has been widely applied to various areas, such as biological gene prediction, social recommendation, etc.
Recent works have exposed that GNN is vulnerable to the backdoor attack, i.e., models trained with maliciously crafted training samples are easily fooled by patched samples.
Most of the proposed studies launch the backdoor attack using a trigger that either is the randomly generated subgraph (e.g., erdHos-r'enyi backdoor) for less computational burden, or the gradient-based generative subgraph (e.g
- Score: 1.9109292348200242
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: Graph neural network (GNN) with a powerful representation capability has been
widely applied to various areas, such as biological gene prediction, social
recommendation, etc. Recent works have exposed that GNN is vulnerable to the
backdoor attack, i.e., models trained with maliciously crafted training samples
are easily fooled by patched samples. Most of the proposed studies launch the
backdoor attack using a trigger that either is the randomly generated subgraph
(e.g., erd\H{o}s-r\'enyi backdoor) for less computational burden, or the
gradient-based generative subgraph (e.g., graph trojaning attack) to enable a
more effective attack. However, the interpretation of how is the trigger
structure and the effect of the backdoor attack related has been overlooked in
the current literature. Motifs, recurrent and statistically significant
sub-graphs in graphs, contain rich structure information. In this paper, we are
rethinking the trigger from the perspective of motifs, and propose a
motif-based backdoor attack, denoted as Motif-Backdoor. It contributes from
three aspects. (i) Interpretation: it provides an in-depth explanation for
backdoor effectiveness by the validity of the trigger structure from motifs,
leading to some novel insights, e.g., using subgraphs that appear less
frequently in the graph as the trigger can achieve better attack performance.
(ii) Effectiveness: Motif-Backdoor reaches the state-of-the-art (SOTA) attack
performance in both black-box and defensive scenarios. (iii) Efficiency: based
on the graph motif distribution, Motif-Backdoor can quickly obtain an effective
trigger structure without target model feedback or subgraph model generation.
Extensive experimental results show that Motif-Backdoor realizes the SOTA
performance on three popular models and four public datasets compared with five
baselines.
Related papers
- Data Free Backdoor Attacks [83.10379074100453]
DFBA is a retraining-free and data-free backdoor attack without changing the model architecture.
We verify that our injected backdoor is provably undetectable and unchosen by various state-of-the-art defenses.
Our evaluation on multiple datasets demonstrates that our injected backdoor: 1) incurs negligible classification loss, 2) achieves 100% attack success rates, and 3) bypasses six existing state-of-the-art defenses.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2024-12-09T05:30:25Z) - DMGNN: Detecting and Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in Graph Neural Networks [30.766013737094532]
We propose DMGNN against out-of-distribution (OOD) and in-distribution (ID) graph backdoor attacks.
DMGNN can easily identify the hidden ID and OOD triggers via predicting label transitions based on counterfactual explanation.
DMGNN far outperforms the state-of-the-art (SOTA) defense methods, reducing the attack success rate to 5% with almost negligible degradation in model performance.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2024-10-18T01:08:03Z) - Robustness-Inspired Defense Against Backdoor Attacks on Graph Neural Networks [30.82433380830665]
Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved promising results in tasks such as node classification and graph classification.
Recent studies reveal that GNNs are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, posing a significant threat to their real-world adoption.
We propose using random edge dropping to detect backdoors and theoretically show that it can efficiently distinguish poisoned nodes from clean ones.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2024-06-14T08:46:26Z) - Backdoor Attack with Sparse and Invisible Trigger [57.41876708712008]
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks.
backdoor attack is an emerging yet threatening training-phase threat.
We propose a sparse and invisible backdoor attack (SIBA)
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2023-05-11T10:05:57Z) - Rethinking the Trigger-injecting Position in Graph Backdoor Attack [7.4968235623939155]
Backdoor attacks have been demonstrated as a security threat for machine learning models.
In this paper, we study two trigger-injecting strategies for backdoor attacks on Graph Neural Networks (GNNs)
Our results show that, generally, LIAS performs better, and the differences between the LIAS and MIAS performance can be significant.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2023-04-05T07:50:05Z) - Unnoticeable Backdoor Attacks on Graph Neural Networks [29.941951380348435]
In particular, backdoor attack poisons the graph by attaching triggers and the target class label to a set of nodes in the training graph.
In this paper, we study a novel problem of unnoticeable graph backdoor attacks with limited attack budget.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2023-02-11T01:50:58Z) - Untargeted Backdoor Attack against Object Detection [69.63097724439886]
We design a poison-only backdoor attack in an untargeted manner, based on task characteristics.
We show that, once the backdoor is embedded into the target model by our attack, it can trick the model to lose detection of any object stamped with our trigger patterns.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2022-11-02T17:05:45Z) - BATT: Backdoor Attack with Transformation-based Triggers [72.61840273364311]
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks.
Backdoor adversaries inject hidden backdoors that can be activated by adversary-specified trigger patterns.
One recent research revealed that most of the existing attacks failed in the real physical world.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2022-11-02T16:03:43Z) - Backdoor Defense via Suppressing Model Shortcuts [91.30995749139012]
In this paper, we explore the backdoor mechanism from the angle of the model structure.
We demonstrate that the attack success rate (ASR) decreases significantly when reducing the outputs of some key skip connections.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2022-11-02T15:39:19Z) - Defending Against Backdoor Attack on Graph Nerual Network by
Explainability [7.147386524788604]
We propose the first backdoor detection and defense method on GNN.
For graph data, current backdoor attack focus on manipulating the graph structure to inject the trigger.
We find that there are apparent differences between benign samples and malicious samples in some explanatory evaluation metrics.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2022-09-07T03:19:29Z) - Check Your Other Door! Establishing Backdoor Attacks in the Frequency
Domain [80.24811082454367]
We show the advantages of utilizing the frequency domain for establishing undetectable and powerful backdoor attacks.
We also show two possible defences that succeed against frequency-based backdoor attacks and possible ways for the attacker to bypass them.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2021-09-12T12:44:52Z) - Backdoor Attacks to Graph Neural Networks [73.56867080030091]
We propose the first backdoor attack to graph neural networks (GNN)
In our backdoor attack, a GNN predicts an attacker-chosen target label for a testing graph once a predefined subgraph is injected to the testing graph.
Our empirical results show that our backdoor attacks are effective with a small impact on a GNN's prediction accuracy for clean testing graphs.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2020-06-19T14:51:01Z)
This list is automatically generated from the titles and abstracts of the papers in this site.
This site does not guarantee the quality of this site (including all information) and is not responsible for any consequences.