Evaluating the Security of Satellite Systems

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2312.01330v1
• Date: Sun, 3 Dec 2023 09:38:28 GMT
• Title: Evaluating the Security of Satellite Systems
• Authors: Roy Peled, Eran Aizikovich, Edan Habler, Yuval Elovici, Asaf Shabtai,
• Abstract summary: This paper presents a comprehensive taxonomy of adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures explicitly targeting satellites. We examine the space ecosystem including the ground, space, Communication, and user segments, highlighting their architectures, functions, and vulnerabilities. We propose a novel extension of the MITRE ATT&CK framework to categorize satellite attack techniques across the adversary lifecycle from reconnaissance to impact.
• Score: 24.312198733476063
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Satellite systems are facing an ever-increasing amount of cybersecurity threats as their role in communications, navigation, and other services expands. Recent papers have examined attacks targeting satellites and space systems; however, they did not comprehensively analyze the threats to satellites and systematically identify adversarial techniques across the attack lifecycle. This paper presents a comprehensive taxonomy of adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures explicitly targeting LEO satellites. First, we analyze the space ecosystem including the ground, space, Communication, and user segments, highlighting their architectures, functions, and vulnerabilities. Then, we examine the threat landscape, including adversary types, and capabilities, and survey historical and recent attacks such as jamming, spoofing, and supply chain. Finally, we propose a novel extension of the MITRE ATT&CK framework to categorize satellite attack techniques across the adversary lifecycle from reconnaissance to impact. The taxonomy is demonstrated by modeling high-profile incidents, including the Viasat attack that disrupted Ukraine's communications. The taxonomy provides the foundation for the development of defenses against emerging cyber risks to space assets. The proposed threat model will advance research in the space domain and contribute to the security of the space domain against sophisticated attacks.

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