Bribe & Fork: Cheap Bribing Attacks via Forking Threat

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.01363v2
• Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2024 06:30:17 GMT
• Title: Bribe & Fork: Cheap Bribing Attacks via Forking Threat
• Authors: Zeta Avarikioti, Paweł Kędzior, Tomasz Lizurej, Tomasz Michalak,
• Abstract summary: Bribe & Fork is a modified bribing attack that leverages the threat of a so-called feather fork. We empirically analyze historical data of some real-world blockchain implementations to evaluate the scale of this cost reduction. Our findings shed more light on the potential vulnerability of PCNs and highlight the need for robust solutions.
• Score: 2.9061423802698565
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: In this work, we reexamine the vulnerability of Payment Channel Networks (PCNs) to bribing attacks, where an adversary incentivizes blockchain miners to deliberately ignore a specific transaction to undermine the punishment mechanism of PCNs. While previous studies have posited a prohibitive cost for such attacks, we show that this cost may be dramatically reduced (to approximately \$125), thereby increasing the likelihood of these attacks. To this end, we introduce Bribe & Fork, a modified bribing attack that leverages the threat of a so-called feather fork which we analyze with a novel formal model for the mining game with forking. We empirically analyze historical data of some real-world blockchain implementations to evaluate the scale of this cost reduction. Our findings shed more light on the potential vulnerability of PCNs and highlight the need for robust solutions.

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