RowPress Vulnerability in Modern DRAM Chips

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.16153v2
• Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2024 22:02:11 GMT
• Title: RowPress Vulnerability in Modern DRAM Chips
• Authors: Haocong Luo, Ataberk Olgun, A. Giray Yağlıkçı, Yahya Can Tuğrul, Steve Rhyner, Meryem Banu Cavlak, Joël Lindegger, Mohammad Sadrosadati, Onur Mutlu,
• Abstract summary: We demonstrate RowPress, a DRAM read disturbance phenomenon different from the well-known RowHammer. We experimentally characterize RowPress bitflips, showing their widespread existence in commodity off-the-shelf DDR4 DRAM chips. We propose effective mitigation techniques that protect DRAM against both RowHammer and RowPress.
• Score: 7.046976177695823
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Memory isolation is a critical property for system reliability, security, and safety. We demonstrate RowPress, a DRAM read disturbance phenomenon different from the well-known RowHammer. RowPress induces bitflips by keeping a DRAM row open for a long period of time instead of repeatedly opening and closing the row. We experimentally characterize RowPress bitflips, showing their widespread existence in commodity off-the-shelf DDR4 DRAM chips. We demonstrate RowPress bitflips in a real system that already has RowHammer protection, and propose effective mitigation techniques that protect DRAM against both RowHammer and RowPress.

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