Fingerprint Theft Using Smart Padlocks: Droplock Exploits and Defenses

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.21398v1
• Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2024 07:40:05 GMT
• Title: Fingerprint Theft Using Smart Padlocks: Droplock Exploits and Defenses
• Authors: Steve Kerrison,
• Abstract summary: A lack of attention to device security and user-awareness beyond the primary function of these IoT devices may be exposing users to invisible risks. This paper extends upon prior work that defined the "droplock", an attack whereby a smart lock is turned into a wireless fingerprint harvester. We perform a more in-depth analysis of a broader range of vulnerabilities and exploits that make a droplock attack easier to perform and harder to detect.
• Score: 0.0
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
• Abstract: There is growing adoption of smart devices such as digital locks with remote control and sophisticated authentication mechanisms. However, a lack of attention to device security and user-awareness beyond the primary function of these IoT devices may be exposing users to invisible risks. This paper extends upon prior work that defined the "droplock", an attack whereby a smart lock is turned into a wireless fingerprint harvester. We perform a more in-depth analysis of a broader range of vulnerabilities and exploits that make a droplock attack easier to perform and harder to detect. Analysis is extended to a range of other smart lock models, and a threat model is used as the basis to recommend stronger security controls that may mitigate the risks of such as attack.

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