Prices, Bids, Values: Everything, Everywhere, All at Once

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2411.09355v1
• Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2024 10:56:00 GMT
• Title: Prices, Bids, Values: Everything, Everywhere, All at Once
• Authors: Ermis Soumalias, Jakob Heiss, Jakob Weissteiner, Sven Seuken,
• Abstract summary: We study the design of iterative auctions (ICAs) We propose a novel machine learning algorithm that integrates the full information from both query types. We present MLHCA, the most efficient ICA ever designed.
• Score: 13.724491757145385
• License:
• Abstract: We study the design of iterative combinatorial auctions (ICAs). The main challenge in this domain is that the bundle space grows exponentially in the number of items. To address this, several papers have recently proposed machine learning (ML)-based preference elicitation algorithms that aim to elicit only the most important information from bidders to maximize efficiency. The SOTA ML-based algorithms elicit bidders' preferences via value queries (i.e., "What is your value for the bundle $\{A,B\}$?"). However, the most popular iterative combinatorial auction in practice elicits information via more practical \emph{demand queries} (i.e., "At prices $p$, what is your most preferred bundle of items?"). In this paper, we examine the advantages of value and demand queries from both an auction design and an ML perspective. We propose a novel ML algorithm that provably integrates the full information from both query types. As suggested by our theoretical analysis, our experimental results verify that combining demand and value queries results in significantly better learning performance. Building on these insights, we present MLHCA, the most efficient ICA ever designed. MLHCA substantially outperforms the previous SOTA in realistic auction settings, delivering large efficiency gains. Compared to the previous SOTA, MLHCA reduces efficiency loss by up to a factor of 10, and in the most challenging and realistic domain, MLHCA outperforms the previous SOTA using 30% fewer queries. Thus, MLHCA achieves efficiency improvements that translate to welfare gains of hundreds of millions of USD, while also reducing the cognitive load on the bidders, establishing a new benchmark both for practicability and for economic impact.

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