Among Us: A Sandbox for Agentic Deception

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2504.04072v1
• Date: Sat, 05 Apr 2025 06:09:32 GMT
• Title: Among Us: A Sandbox for Agentic Deception
• Authors: Satvik Golechha, Adrià Garriga-Alonso,
• Abstract summary: Among Us is a text-based social-deduction game environment.<n>LLM-agents exhibit human-style deception naturally while they think, speak, and act with other agents or humans.<n>We evaluate the effectiveness of AI safety techniques for detecting lying and deception in Among Us.
• Score: 1.1893676124374688
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
• Abstract: Studying deception in AI agents is important and difficult due to the lack of model organisms and sandboxes that elicit the behavior without asking the model to act under specific conditions or inserting intentional backdoors. Extending upon $\textit{AmongAgents}$, a text-based social-deduction game environment, we aim to fix this by introducing Among Us as a rich sandbox where LLM-agents exhibit human-style deception naturally while they think, speak, and act with other agents or humans. We introduce Deception ELO as an unbounded measure of deceptive capability, suggesting that frontier models win more because they're better at deception, not at detecting it. We evaluate the effectiveness of AI safety techniques (LLM-monitoring of outputs, linear probes on various datasets, and sparse autoencoders) for detecting lying and deception in Among Us, and find that they generalize very well out-of-distribution. We open-source our sandbox as a benchmark for future alignment research and hope that this is a good testbed to improve safety techniques to detect and remove agentically-motivated deception, and to anticipate deceptive abilities in LLMs.

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