Simulating Single Transferable Voting for the Colorado House of Representatives
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2607.25105v1
- Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2026 22:08:39 GMT
- Title: Simulating Single Transferable Voting for the Colorado House of Representatives
- Abstract summary: Using multi-member districts and ranked ballots with STV would affect the representation of political parties in the Colorado House of Representatives.<n>Our simulated STV elections for the Colorado House of Representatives gave more proportional representation for Democrats and Republicans than the current first-past-the-post system.
- Score: 0.0
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: Social choice theory research demonstrates that single transferable voting (STV) results in more proportionally representative legislative bodies. We aim to understand how using multi-member districts and ranked ballots with STV would affect the representation of political parties in the Colorado House of Representatives. We investigated this objective by producing 10,000 multi-member districting plans of Colorado, generating ranked ballots for each of these plans using returns from the 2022 Colorado attorney general race, and simulating STV using these ballots. Our simulated STV elections for the Colorado House of Representatives gave more proportional representation for Democrats and Republicans than the current first-past-the-post system. Future research should explore how the implementation of STV would influence the representation of racial and language minority groups in the Colorado General Assembly to provide guidance on electoral reform in the state.
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